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  • 格致經濟論壇第78期

    發布者:經濟學系     時間:2020-12-07     閱讀次數:206

    報告題目:Fee scheme competition: proportional fee and unit fee(收費模式競爭:按比例vs按單位)

    報告人:古定威(復旦大學)

    報告時間:2020年12月16日(星期三)上午10:00-11:15

    報告地點:商學院大樓318會議室

    邀請部門:經濟學系

     

    報告人簡介:

    古定威,復旦大學管理學院講師,于復旦大學管理學院獲得經濟學博士學位,曾于復旦大學經濟學院從事博士后研究,研究方向為產業組織、縱向相關市場、平臺經濟和反壟斷。他主持的研究項目包括國家自然科學基金青年項目、The British Academy Newton Fund。他的研究成果發表于RAND Journal of Economics,Marketing Letters,Pacific-Basin Financial Journal等國際權威期刊。


    報告摘要:

    We study the platforms' choice when they compete for merchants and consumers by adopting unit fee or proportional fee. We find that: if the merchant is monopoly, adopting unit fee is platforms' weakly dominant strategy; however, if there are multiple merchants compete in Cournot, they have individual but not collective incentive to join platform adopting proportional fee, which leads to proportional fee equilibrium; if the merchants compete in Bertrand, the merchant has both individual and collective incentive to join platform adopting unit fee, which results in unit fee equilibrium. Our findings shed light on platform entry and vertical integration/separation.


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